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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1203 
___________ 
 
EMMA MILLER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TYCO ELECTRONICS, LTD. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-10-cv-02479) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 30, 2013 
 
Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 6, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Emma Miller appeals the jury’s adverse verdict, claiming that it is 
against the weight of the evidence.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
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 This case concerns defendant Tyco Electronics, Ltd.’s termination of Miller’s 
employment.  For about eight years, Miller worked in a Tyco facility in East Berlin, 
Pennsylvania, and apparently performed satisfactorily.  However, in 2007, the East Berlin 
facility closed, and Miller transferred to a plant in Harrisburg.  There, Miller’s 
responsibilities changed, and she struggled.  Miller believed that she should have been 
given more training to allow her to succeed in her new role; Tyco contended that her 
training was sufficient.  In any event, in November 2008, Miller’s supervisor, James 
Smith, gave her the lowest-possible score in her performance review.  Then, in March 
2009, Tyco engaged in a reduction of force; as part of this reduction, it terminated all 
individuals in Miller’s department who had received the lowest rating in their 
performance reviews or who had been the subject of a disciplinary action.  Based on this 
criteria, Miller was laid off.   
 Miller then instituted an action in the District Court, claiming that Tyco violated 
her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act by discriminatorily terminating her employment because of her gender and national 
origin (she is Filipino).  Tyco filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District 
Court denied, and the case proceeded to trial.  At the close of trial, the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Tyco.  Miller then filed a timely notice of appeal. 
On appeal, Miller argues that the jury’s verdict on each of her claims “was against 
the weight of the evidence.”  Because Miller repeatedly invokes the phrase “weight of the 
evidence,” and relies on cases that apply that standard, we understand her to claim that 
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the District Court should have granted her a new trial.  See Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 
174 F.3d 352, 364-65 (3d Cir. 1999) (contrasting claims that the verdict was against the 
weight of the evidence with claims that the evidence was insufficient to support a jury’s 
verdict).  Typically, we review weight-of-the-evidence claims for abuse of discretion.  
See Montgomery Cnty. v. Microvote Corp., 320 F.3d 440, 445 (3d Cir. 2003).  A new 
trial should be granted on this basis only where the “great weight” of the evidence cuts 
against the verdict and “where a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were to 
stand.”  Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1076 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(en banc). 
Tyco contends, however, that Miller has failed to preserve this challenge for 
appeal.  We agree.  As the Supreme Court has held, “a party is not entitled to pursue a 
new trial on appeal unless that party makes an appropriate postverdict motion in the 
district court.”  Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 404 
(2006).  Here, Miller (who was represented by counsel in the District Court) did not file a 
motion under Rule 50 or Rule 59 at any time after the jury returned its verdict.  She has 
therefore waived these claims.  See Etienne v. Inter-County Sec. Corp., 173 F.3d 1372, 
1375 (11th Cir. 1999).
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We will therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
                                              
1
 The result would be the same if we construed Miller’s brief to raise a sufficiency-of-the-
evidence claim, as she would still have waived the claim on appeal by failing to file a 
post-trial motion.  See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc., 546 U.S. at 404-05.  
